The term “three-generations-in-tobacco” has become synonymous in China with a privileged elite who monopolize coveted jobs, such as within the state-owned tobacco monopoly, passing them down through their families. According to The Economist, this phenomenon has sparked widespread anger and accusations of a closed circle of power that stifles opportunities for social advancement.
The optimism of the 1990s, when social mobility soared, is giving way to concerns about social stagnation. A faltering economy and dwindling job opportunities have led to widespread disillusionment. Research shows a growing belief that connections and family wealth, rather than hard work and ability, determine success. This trend contradicts the Communist Party’s claim to have established a society based on the working class.
While President Xi Jinping calls for greater social mobility and common prosperity, the public mood remains largely unmoved. Online discussions criticizing elitism and the perceived injustices of the system are often swiftly censored, further fuelling discontent.
Measuring social mobility
The intergenerational elasticity of income (IGE) is a key indicator of social mobility. A higher IGE signifies less mobility. Studies suggest China’s social mobility has decreased compared to the past, while income inequality has risen sharply.
One of the most significant obstacles to social mobility is the hukou system, which restricts rural migrants’ access to urban healthcare, education, and housing. Although reforms have allowed some migrants with permanent jobs to access urban benefits, many still face barriers due to lack of contracts or residential status. In the countryside, unequal access to quality education remains a major hindrance to progress. While university enrollment has increased, rural students are underrepresented at elite institutions.
Middle-class competition
China’s middle class has expanded rapidly, with an estimated 400 million people today. Yet competition for advancement remains fierce. Government attempts to level the playing field, such as the 2021 ban on for-profit tutoring services, widened the gap between wealthy families and the rest, as the richest can still afford private, albeit illicit, tutoring.
Chinese scholars suggest that improving public services could help break the cycle of poverty. However, the government remains wary of expanding welfare programs, fearing economic and political instability. “To promote common prosperity, we must not adopt the approach of welfarism,” Xi cautioned in 2021.
The party’s own elitism is also a concern. Membership is crucial for career advancement in state-run firms, but entry is controlled by insiders. A state television report in April acknowledged public concern over nepotism within state-owned enterprises and local governments, describing the issue as “proliferating in hidden corners.” Despite the censorship of critical comments, discontent continues to simmer, reflecting a public increasingly wary of a system that appears to favour the elite over the common citizen.
