The Window for De-Escalation Is Short — Thailand and Cambodia Must Seize It Now with Trump and Anwar

By Collins Chong

One truth that Thailand and Cambodia must acknowledge is that the window for de-escalation and the opening for credible conflict management is rapidly narrowing. Geopolitical shifts, global economic pressures, and changing domestic politics in both countries mean the space for achieving stability is shrinking, especially when the power timeline for external mediators is also limited.

Both sides must seize the opportunity that exists now, while Malaysia under Anwar Ibrahim still has the term capacity, credibility, and regional trust to lead a neutral yet firm diplomatic process. At the same time, both sides must utilise the momentum created by Trump and the only core leverage that he has created, who is the only one to have the combination of economic pressure and strategic influence to contain escalation.

If this moment is allowed to pass without strategic calibration from the two nations, a vacuum of leadership, lack of political will, and the absence of effective pressure mechanisms will enhance risks and make it more difficult to prevent renewed conflict. Failure to act during this critical period will not only weaken the Kuala Lumpur Peace Accord but open the path to prolonged tensions and possibilities of a protracted conflict that could threaten regional stability and drag others with it.

The criticism emerging in Thailand against Malaysia and the United States over the Kuala Lumpur Peace Accord is largely driven by nationalist and activist groups, not by the Thai government itself. The groups staging protests do not represent Bangkok’s official position, yet they have shaped a significant domestic narrative at a sensitive moment.

They portray Malaysia’s role as restricting Thailand’s military responses and accuse Kuala Lumpur of siding with Cambodia or acting with the US to pressure Thailand into a weaker position. This ignores the fact that Thailand itself agreed to the Accord and was directly involved in negotiations, while Malaysia merely provided a diplomatic and neutral platform.

They also argue that Washington is using trade leverage, tariffs, and economic pressure to shape Thailand’s security behaviour, which they accuse to be violating the sovereignty and interest of Thailand, where it is viewed as an instrument forced by an external power to serve US strategic interests, rather than ASEAN unity or border stability.

These arguments reflect long-standing and deep rooted anxieties and nationalism among segments of Thailand’s political spectrum about external interference and erosion of national autonomy and sovereignty.

Nationalist factions are using this crisis to attack the Anutin government, portraying it as weak or submissive to foreign powers. These also reflect resistance within parts of Thailand’s security institutions toward external monitoring mechanisms such as the ASEAN Observer Team required under the Accord, which is seen as limiting military flexibility and autonomy.

Malaysia’s response to these criticisms has been firm yet calm. Prime Minister Anwar has repeatedly stressed that Malaysia is not a party to the dispute and has never interfered, acting only as a facilitator under ASEAN’s mandate at the request of both Thailand and Cambodia.

His public statements emphasise on the notion of neutrality, regional stability, and humanitarian concern, especially on the efforts of de-escalation  following the landmine incident in Sisaket.

Importantly, Malaysia’s position has been affirmed by Thailand’s own leadership where Anutin stressed that Thailand values Malaysia’s role and has never viewed Kuala Lumpur as interfering in its affairs.

This direct communication underscores that Thai–Malaysian political trust remains solid.

Malaysia continues to support ASEAN stabilisation mechanisms, including the ASEAN Observer Team and joint de-escalation measures. . This approach reassures both Thailand and Cambodia that Malaysia remains a neutral party rather than a geopolitical actor pursuing its own agenda.

The most fragile element and risk is Thailand’s domestic political dynamics, which increasingly influence Bangkok’s stance on the Accord.

The focus on sovereignty narratives to reject any form of ASEAN monitoring or cooperation, creates risks for further pressure where
Thailand may adopt a harder stance at the border, undermining all negotiations.
This also creates the risk of unilateral actions along the border that could trigger new incidents.

If domestic politics worsen, Bangkok may be forced to renegotiate the Accord or to impose stricter conditions on Cambodia, or worse, to delay implementation to appease domestic pressure.
This makes domestic politics a long-term structural threat to regional stability.

 Trump’s Role in Doing What ASEAN Can’t

One of the least discussed and appreciated but most critical factors in the Thailand–Cambodia conflict is how Trump fills the vacuum that ASEAN, by design, cannot.

ASEAN has diplomatic mandate but lacks enforcement mechanisms or the capacity to impose costs on parties that violate agreements.

Trump plays three essential roles. The US economic pressure is the balancing tool ASEAN does not possess.By linking ceasefire compliance to trade negotiations, market access, and potential tariffs, Trump created real incentives and penalties, where no other country can emulate.  ASEAN has no such power. This ensures that Thailand and Cambodia do not take their commitments lightly.

Washington’s security and defence card prevents escalation.
Trump signalled early that instability in Southeast Asia will not be tolerated because it contradicts his Indo-Pacific strategy and his mantra and legacy for peace and for preventing and solving conflicts.

The US approach is not about replacing ASEAN, but strengthening it. Malaysia provides neutrality and regional legitimacy.ASEAN provides the diplomatic framework.

But it is the United States that provides pressure and incentives.
This combination makes the Kuala Lumpur Peace Accord far stronger than what ASEAN could achieve alone.

 Fate of the KL Peace Accord

The continuity of the Kuala Lumpur Peace Accord depends on several factors. The realistic situation on the ground remains pertinent. Without clarity, distrust and wariness will persist. Meaningful progress in de-mining, withdrawal of heavy weaponry, and reducing troop presence in sensitive areas is also crucial, as  the Accord cannot function effectively and serve its original objectives without tangible and realistic de-escalation measures.

Anutin is facing renewed pressure and dilemma at home and must also balance rising nationalist pressure with the strategic calculations to maintain border calm, and to maintain good ties with the both US and Malaysia/ASEAN.

Phnom Penh’s willingness to adhere to the measures, including to accept ASEAN observers, conduct transparent de-mining processes, and avoid troop deployments or escalations near disputed areas is critical in the entire equation. Any new clashes or casualties could undermine Thai political support for the Accord and trigger a new wave  of responses from Thailand. Cambodia understands this dynamic and strategic truth and might employ greater caution to avoid giving new ammunition or pretext to Thai nationalists.

The foremost factor in ensuring the continued adherence of the Accord and the de-escalation process will be the role of the United States. Washington has linked ceasefire progress with trade negotiations, where only Trump can wield this - a strategy that grants leverage but also fuels nationalist backlash in Thailand.

The dilemma here is that If US pressure is too strong, it reinforces the nationalist narrative that the Accord is an American instrument. If too soft, both sides may revert to tactical escalation. The maintenance of incentives without undermining the political legitimacy of the peace process inside Thailand is a strategic next move by Washington.

The final missing link of the viability of the Accord will be the ability of Malaysia and ASEAN to maintain central coordination and effective monitoring and following up. Malaysia’s neutrality, consistency, and sustained diplomacy with a proven track record  will determine the roadmap ahead.

The deeper structural conflict remains unresolved. The Accord is a conflict-management tool, not a final settlement,especially in managing this centuries-old dispute. It does not address colonial-era maps, disputed temples, or competing national narratives – entrenched structural issues that have long fuelled tensions.

Without a long-term process involving border demarcation, legal mechanisms, joint development, and efforts to soften public narratives in both countries, any ceasefire, including this one - will remain vulnerable to shocks such as a landmine incident or small-scale military clashes.

The future of the Kuala Lumpur Peace Accord depends on ground realities, domestic politics in Thailand and Cambodia, calibrated US pressure, and ASEAN’s ability to act collectively. Without progress on these elements, the Accord risks becoming a fragile framework.

Both Thailand and Cambodia must seize on this opening provided by both Anwar and Trump to help to manage and stabilise the situation and the conflict. Without them, the risks of this spiralling out of control are higher than  before. Both must leverage on the current term of leadership for both Trump and Anwar, as new leaderships might not be as capable or interested to play such a role. 

COLLINS CHONG YEW KEAT, Foreign Affairs, Security and Strategy Analyst, Universiti Malaya