The Case for a New World Order

There comes a moment for every generation in which the institutions inherited no longer adequately serve the demands of the world. For the United Nations (UN), the 2026 US-Israel war on Iran was such a moment.

Despite issuing immediate calls for de-escalation and hosting multiple emergency meetings, the UN's role in resolving the conflict remained limited at best. As the conflict continued, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), a body created in the aftermath of the World War II with the express mandate of 'saving succeeding generations from the scourge of war,' met in an emergency session and debated the crisis. Yet it ultimately fell short of achieving its purpose, only producing Resolution 2817, a document that condemned the wronged party for defending itself due to the manner it chose, avoided naming those who had initiated the conflict, and failed to address the dangerous precedent set through the targeted assassinations of foreign heads of state and blatant war crimes such as the strikes on elementary schools.

In contrast, Pakistan, a state not engaged in the conflict nor beholden to resolve it, successfully convened diplomacy that brought together two rival nations in the first high-level direct bilateral talks in 47 years, resulting in a ceasefire agreement. While the durability of the ceasefire itself may be debated, the achievement of it, as well as the continuation of diplomacy, is a feat in and of itself.

However, the core of this argument does not lie in the binary juxtaposition of Pakistan's success and the UN's failure. Rather, both outcomes reveal a deeper and more concerning reality: an international order in which formal multilateral institutions (regardless of their institutional prestige, longevity or ostensible authority) find themselves increasingly subordinated to great power consensus, which is predictably withheld to suit the shifting interests of that same core group.

However, to fully comprehend how this reality came to be, it is necessary to first examine the circumstances that led to it. While the UN's foundational objectives were always progressive and aspirational, the institution was simultaneously shackled by inceptional constraints that have continued to hinder its effectiveness. The veto mechanism of the UNSC, described as a 'Faustian bargain' to gain the compliance of great powers and often used to maintain the P5's (Permanent Five) status quo, is perhaps the most well-known example of this, though the roots of this inefficacy run even deeper. While the P5 system succeeded in gaining the support of major powers, it failed to adapt to the changing world order, leaving no space for emerging voices to be heard. Due to this, the core decision makers of arguably the most influential UN organ, the UNSC, continue to reflect the victors of a war fought 80 years ago, leaving major populations of the world underrepresented.

Another key point of concern for the UN is the lack of enforcement capability. While the founders of the UN were acutely aware of this deficiency, having witnessed the League of Nations fail to curb aggression in Manchuria, Italy and Germany in the 1930s due to the lack of military capability, they still remained hesitant to entrust a supranational body with a force that could feasibly intervene in state affairs. As a result, the UN must rely on its member states to supply troops, funding and equipment for its missions, leaving it able to pass resolutions yet woefully deficient in its ability to actually implement them. This limitation has continued to feature prominently, with one of the most tragic cases being the fall of Srebrenica, in which UN resolutions 819 and 824, enveloping Srebrenica and several other Bosnian cities under UN protection, failed to effectively materialise due to troop and equipment shortages, resulting in the deadliest massacre since World War II.

Although these issues are neither new nor lacking in discussion, meaningful reforms nonetheless remain elusive. This is largely in part due to the procedural weaknesses highlighted above, which require both majority approval as well as unanimous consensus by the P5 states in order to introduce any amendments. While several proposals, regarding expansions in the P5 and increasing the power of the General Assembly during Security Council deadlocks, have been raised, progress remains slow due to the aforementioned requirements.

In view of these limitations as well as the success of alternative means of conflict resolutions – such as Pakistan's recent success in mediating a ceasefire agreement between the US and Iran – the case for viable substitutes (which supplement rather than completely replace) grows stronger. In this regard, several options can be explored. The path of least resistance could be the reconstitution and expansion of existing multilateral forums such as the SCO (Shanghai Cooperation Organisation) or BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) into expanded versions that could serve as suitable parallel mechanisms to the UN. However, these also involve their own set of challenges, including but not limited to internal divisions, lack of universal acceptance and absence of enforcement mechanisms.

A more feasible alternative to this might be an ad hoc coalition of middle powers that acts as an issue-specific grouping of relevant neutral powers rather than a formal institution, which may raise the risk of bloc-based politics. Similar models have already shown promise in the form of the recent mediation of the US-Israel war on Iran, as well as through groups such as BASIC (Brazil, South Africa, India, China), which successfully influenced the 2009 Copenhagen Accords and the 2015 Paris Agreement to encourage greater participation by allowing for self-determined climate change goals for countries.

While this approach may indeed carry its own drawbacks, the key to ensuring success in any parallel track to the UN is to uphold a core set of principles. This includes ensuring equal dignity and representation in decision-making for all states, regardless of size, in order to ensure that, at a minimum, the right to condemn and stop aggression cannot be vetoed by the aggressor state. Credible alternatives for enforcement must also exist in the absence of legal mandates (such as in the case of the UN) to raise the price of unilateral action, for instance, through economic interdependence or diplomatic isolation. Additionally, guardrails such as rotating presidencies must be present to prevent the consolidation of power within a few states. All in all, while a supplementary mechanism is required to offset the UN's weaknesses, it must be handled with care to avoid falling into the same pitfalls.

Sajal Shahid is a Research Assistant at the Centre for Aerospace & Security Studies (CASS) Islamabad. She can be reached at [email protected]